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Despite the recent dramatic increase in financial inclusion, to this day an estimated 1.7 billion
adults worldwide lack access to formal financial services.1 Many are ultra-poor, living under
the equivalent of USD 1.90 per day. For them, any financial difficulty such as sickness or a
bad harvest is a formidable challenge. For this reason, a large proportion of the unbanked
turn to informal, community-based savings and credit groups such as ROSCAs and - most
recently - savings groups (SGs).
The basic framework of a SG involves a group of people that save with and borrow from
each other. The group meets weekly over the course of a cycle (typically a year). At the
initial meeting, the group establishes its rules of operation, including the interest rate charged
on loans. At subsequent meeting, those who wish to save have an opportunity to place their
money in the group’s safe, and those who need a loan can request to borrow from the group
funds. At the end of each cycle, the money in the safe is redistributed among the members
in proportion their total contributions in savings. Thus a return on savings is generated,
as each member receives back his or her savings plus a fraction of the interest payments
collected by the group. Because SGs are designed to operate without outside support, they
can reach a population not reached by traditional microfinance interventions. Despite their
novelty, SGs are quickly becoming extremely popular. In Uganda, for instance, 43% of the
population belong to an SG, while only 9% report belonging to a ROSCA (FinScope, 2018).
Global estimates of the number of participants range from 11.5 million participants to over
100 million.2
This paper contributes to the understanding of SGs in three ways. Firstly, we propose
1 That is, they are “without an account at a financial institution or through a mobile money provider”
(See https://globalfindex.worldbank.org).
2 The first number comes from SEEP (2016) and includes only members of VSLAs (a particular variety of
SG) established by international NGOs. The second number is from Greaney, Kaboski, and Van Leemput
(2016, p. 1614).
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a theoretical model of a SG that explicitly incorporates its rules of operation.3 Next, we
analyze the weekly financial records of a sample of Ugandan SGs. Doing so, we provide the
most accurate description to date of the evolution of these groups throughout their cycle.4
Lastly, using the results of the model and the empirical analysis, we then propose two changes
to the rules of operation of SGs that, we believe, could significantly improve the welfare of
their members.
The first result of the model is that multiple, Pareto-ranked equilibria may exist. The
reason is that, in a SG, the amount each member can borrow is capped to three times the
amount saved by the group member as of the date that the loan was requested. Consequently,
a member that wishes to borrow must first save, which implies that the cost of borrowing
decreases with the return on savings. If the return on savings is expected to be high,
borrowing will be high, and so will be the rate of utilization of the available funds and the
return on savings. But if the return on savings is expected to be low, so will be borrowings,
the rate of funds utilization and the return on savings. It follows that groups’ performance
may be poor due to a coordination failure among its members.5
We also show that even the Pareto preferred equilibrium is inefficient. This is a conse-
quence from the cost of borrowing being fixed and established by the group at the beginning
of the cycle. The primary implication is that SGs lack a mechanism to equate supply and
demand for funds; hence, funds may be either rationed (i.e., not all members wishing to
borrow are able to do so) or may be abundant (i.e., funds remain in the group’s safe and are
not put to productive use).
3 Greaney et al. (2016) also develop a formal model of SG, but focus on the process of selection into a SG,
without modeling explicitly how the group operates once formed. We complement their analysis by studying
how the groups operate once they form, abstracting away from the process of group’s formation.
4 The majority of study on SG look exclusively at end-of-cycle outcomes. To the best of our knowledge,
the only exceptions are Salas (2014), Burlando and Canidio (2016), and Burlando and Canidio (2017) who
collect data on individual cumulative savings and borrowing at roughly 4 months intervals.
5 This is consistent with the observation that group outcomes can be influenced by seemingly irrelevant
factors. For example, Deserranno, Stryjan, and Sulaiman (2017) show that the mechanism of selection of
leadership positions in savings groups (secret ballot or open discussion) affects SGs outcomes in important
ways.
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The possibility of a mismatch between supply and demand for funds gives rise to an
externality problem: a member’s borrowing and saving decisions affect other group partici-
pants. For example, an additional unit of savings contributed to the group during periods
where funds are scarce generates a positive externality, because this additional unit can be
used to meet the demand for loans of others. Conversely, an additional unit saved during
periods where funds are already abundant generates a negative externality, because this unit
of savings is not lent out and only decreases the return on savings for all members.
Less obvious is how the timing of savings affects the rest of the group. Our main result
(and the one that will be most relevant from the policy perspective) is that shifting savings
from later periods to earlier on in the cycle generates a positive externality on the other
members of the group. Anticipating savings may generate additional lending if these savings
are moved to a period of scarcity, because they can be lent out, generate a return that
can itself be lent out in the future. Importantly, anticipating savings does not change total
savings and hence cannot decrease the return on savings of all other members, even if it fails
to generate extra lending. We conclude the model by arguing that the mismatch between
demand and supply of funds is robust to the fact that the interest rate is chosen by the
group. The reason is that member’s preferences over the interest rate ignore other members’
ability to satisfy their demand for funds at those rates. Hence, individual preferences over
the interest rate do not align with social welfare.
We then test empirically the main premise of the model: that there can be a mismatch
between supply and demand for funds. We develop a method to identify loan rationing in
SGs, and apply it on the detailed records of weekly transactions from 46 Ugandan groups,
heterogeneous in terms of geographic dispersion and experience. We show that, for the vast
majority of groups, funds are rationed for the first half of the cycle, and for about 60%
of groups funds are rationed for most of the cycle. This provides empirical evidence that
scarcity may be a defining feature of SGs. We also find that funds remain idle in the groups’
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safe during the second half of the cycle.
Despite the success of SGs in bringing financial services to unbanked populations, our
results highlight that these institutions have important shortcomings. We discuss two simple
policies that can improve SGs ability to satisfy the financial needs of its members. First,
members should be allowed to shift savings from later periods to earlier periods. The second
is to allow for formal financial institutions to provide joint liability loans to SGs, a practice
already widespread and known as in sub-Saharan Africa. We prove that these joint liability
loans, if appropriately constructed, can increase the welfare of all members of the group.
Relevant literature. The existing literature suggests that savings groups are a useful tool
for local development (see Ashe and Neilan, 2003). Randomized evaluations of savings groups
found a range of positive effects, including an increase in savings and borrowing, in food
security, overall consumption smoothing, livestock holding, household business outcomes
and women’s empowerment (see Ksoll, Lilleør, Lønborg, and Rasmussen, 2015, Beaman,
Karlan, and Thuysbaert, 2014, Gash and Odell, 2013, Karlan, Savonitto, Thuysbaert, and
Udry, 2017 and the recent review of the evidence in Gash, 2017).
A more recent strand of the literature studies the functioning of SGs. Most closely related
to our paper is the work by Greaney, Kaboski, and Van Leemput (2016), which develops a
theoretical model of the group formation process and shows (theoretically and empirically)
that charging a membership fee functions as a screening mechanism that improves the per-
formance of the group. In their model, the authors assume that the savings group operates
as a frictionless credit market. Here, we model in detail the rules determining the allocation
of credit within a SG and, as a consequence, the return on savings, while abstracting away
from group formation. Cassidy and Fafchamps (2018) also study the group formation pro-
cess, and show that this process is able to match those who demand funds with those who
supply funds over some dimensions (present bias) but not others (occupation). Burlando and
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Canidio (2016) analyzes financial flows within the group and finds that wealthier members
are more likely be net lenders to poorer members.
Some experimental studies involving SGs are directly relevant for our theoretical results.
Burlando and Canidio (2017) randomly assign members to groups with varying composition,
and find that groups that are wealthier are better able to generate loanable funds, which are
then lent to their poorest members. The proposed mechanism for this result is scarcity of
funds. Our paper provides more direct evidence for the presence of scarcity in SGs. Deser-
ranno et al. (2019) randomly vary the procedure through which groups choose their leaders,
which leads to variation in the leaders’ characteristics. Strikingly, they measure treatment
effects on lending outcomes, and indicate leader selection as the primary mechanism. This is
consistent with a model of multiple equilibria. Burlando, Goldberg, and Etcheverry (2018)
measure the impact of a linkage product in Uganda; consistent with the model, they find
increases in internal lending following the bank loan. They also find increases in turnover
within the group, indicating the importance of selection effects that fall outside of the scope
of this paper.
Finally, our paper belongs to a large literature studying nonmarket credit institutions.
For example, SGs are clearly related to ROSCAs because the funds distributed to its members
originate within the group (see Besley, Coate, and Loury, 1993). SG funds are available to
smooth consumption, whereas fixed ROSCA members are restricted to receiving a certain
amount of funds at a specific date. Another related literature studies the use of collateral
and joint liability to ease moral hazard or adverse selection, such as the seminal paper on
credit cooperatives by Banerjee, Besley, and Guinnane (1994). Interestingly, Flatnes and
Carter (2019) find that a combination of joint liability and collateral requirements is the
most effective mechanism to reduce moral hazard in joint liability microfinance loans. SG
loans are collateralized, and can be characterized as a type of joint liability (if an individual
defaults, the other members have to forgo an amount equal to defaulted loan). Unlike credit
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unions, savings groups supply all loanable funds.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2 we provide a detailed de-
scription of how SGs work. Section 3 presents and solves a model of SG. In Section 4 we
provide empirical evidence that savings groups operate under long periods of scarcity. In Sec-
tion 5 we discuss policies that reduce funds scarcity. Section 6 concludes. All mathematical
derivations missing from the text are in Appendix A.
2 Background information on savings groups
The first savings groups were created in the early 1990s in Niger by CARE International
and were called “Village Savings and Loan Associations” (VSLAs). Shortly after, several
NGOs began promoting savings groups inspired by the VSLA model, including Catholic
Relief Services’ Savings and Internal Lending Communities (SILC) and Oxfam’s Saving for
Change (SfC), which remain the most popular models together with VSLAs. Despite the
different names, all these savings groups operate under similar rules (see Allen and Panetta,
2010). Therefore, while the description of the functioning of savings groups in this paper most
closely resembles VSLAs, our empirical and theoretical results apply to the most common
types of SGs.
Group formation Groups are typically formed through a guided process led by a trainer,
or field officer. The trainer gathers a critical number of possible participants in a community,
and then proceeds to explain the basic functioning of a SG. The community members who
are interested in forming a SG undergo a training period, at the end of which a membership
list is drawn and group operation starts. A group can have anywhere between 15 and 40
participants.
In many cases, trainers are employed by NGOs or by community-based organizations
that specialize in financial intermediation. It is quite common to find that experienced
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savings groups members become trainers themselves, and start forming new groups in nearby
communities.
Rule and leadership selection Operations of the group are governed by a constitution,
which is typically adopted during the first meeting after the training period. This document
specifies a set of rules, such as the length of the savings cycle, the interest rate charged on
loans, the permissible savings amounts, the size and possible uses of an insurance fund. In
addition, groups often adopt an extensive set of policies and procedures that govern how
meetings are run, how collective decisions are taken or voted on, attendance policies, and a
set of fines and fees sanctioning violators of rules.
The group also selects a number of group officials or representatives, which may include
a chairperson and a treasurer. These officials ensure that accounts are kept correctly and
group meetings proceed in an orderly fashion and according to the rules.
Savings At the beginning of each weekly meeting, each member saves with the group by
purchasing shares. The share is a permissible and indivisible savings amount, and a member
can typically purchase between zero and five shares per meeting. As such, the share value
implicitly imposes an upper bound to the amount an individual can save within the group.
Savings deposits are recorded in a group ledger and in an individual savings booklet. All
cash deposits are pooled and kept in a metal safe box, which is opened only when the group
is in session. Members are not allowed to withdraw their savings during the cycle.
Borrowing Funds that are accumulated in the safe box are made available to members of
the group as interest bearing loans. Individual loans are extended to group members subject
to three constraints: the group must agree on the stated purpose of the loan; loan sizes
are restricted to three times the amount saved by the borrower until that point; and total
loan disbursements should not exceed the amount available in the safe box. Within these
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conditions, multiple borrowers can obtain loans of varying sizes at the same time. Loans
must be repaid within three months, and the interest on the principal compounds monthly.
Once the loan is paid back, the borrower is eligible to borrow again. Borrowing starts three
months after the beginning of the cycle. Three months before the end of the cycle, loan
disbursements ends and all outstanding loans are repaid.
Insurance In addition to loan intermediation, most savings groups provide insurance as an
additional financial service. Each member makes a required and fixed weekly contribution
to an insurance pool. Typically, this contribution is small relative to savings.6 Funds from
the insurance pool are kept separate from the savings, and can be lent out to members in
case of an emergency, such as funerals or severe illness. Standard repayment procedures are
implemented, although no interest is collected on the emergency loan.
Accounting While individual members maintain their own passbooks, the group assigns a
record keeper who maintains a log of individual savings, group cash in (savings, repayments,
and fines), and loans serviced. The record keeper utilizes a savings ledger to record the total
amount saved by each member in any given meeting. Also included in this ledger is a total
savings balance amount. A cash-book is then updated with group-level balances at the end of
the meeting (including carryover balances from previous meetings). All of these records are
hand written and the record keeper is responsible for accurate calculations and reporting.
This technique, however, does allow for human error (see Appendix A for a description of
how we correct for these issues for the data used in this paper).
Share out A unique feature of savings groups is their ability to provide positive returns
on accumulated savings, which are realized at the end of the cycle in the process generally
known as share-out. During share-out, the content of the safe box is emptied and divided
6 For example, in Burlando and Canidio (2017) the value of the weekly insurance contribution is between
one fourth of a share and one share.
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among the members of the group in a way that is proportional to the amount each person
saved. Hence, each member receives back everything he or she saved with the group, plus a
fraction of the interest rate payments on loans. This fraction is equal to the amount saved
by this person relative to total savings. More formally, if during weekly meeting t member i
saves si,t, at share out she receives (1 +R)
∑










r is the interest rate on loans and bi is the cumulative amount borrowed by participant i.
3 A model of Savings Groups
In this section we present a theoretical model of SG. We abstract away from potential
sources of inefficiencies such as moral hazard, adverse selection, behavioral biases, voluntary
or involuntary defaults.7 Despite this, we show that the rules governing an SG can give rise
to an inefficient outcome.
Before presenting the model, an important observation regarding the scope of the analysis.
Under our assumptions, by the first welfare theorem the efficient mechanism to allocate funds
within the group is a frictionless financial market in which, in every period, a Walrasian
auctioneer determines the market-clearing interest rate. Understanding what prevents the
existence of these markets in rural areas of the developing world is beyond the scope of
this paper. We therefore cannot discuss the constrained optimal mechanism for financial
intermediation. In Section 5 we present two modifications to the rules governing SG that
are sufficiently minor to be considered as feasible, and at the same time generate a Pareto
7 In line with the evidence from microfinance, also in the context of SGs defaults are rare occurrences.
For example, Burlando and Canidio (2017) report that 97% of all loans are fully repaid by shareout. Note
also that at share out the group can seize the savings of a borrower who has not repaid in full. Hence, the
fraction of default (always partial) is likely much lower than 3%. In groups studied in Burlando et al. (2018),
two thirds of groups reported no loans written off in the previous cycle. The median amount lost through
default, conditional on some default, was 6% of the shareout value.
3 A model of Savings Groups 11
improvement relative to the standard rules of operation of SGs.
Consider a group composed of n individuals. The timing of the game is the following:
• In period 0, the group agrees on the interest rate r that will be charged on loans and
on the maximum savings per period s. As previously discussed, the maximum savings
per period is implicitly determined by the share value chosen by the group. Here, we
abstract away from the fact that savings are allowed only in multiples of the share
values. As a consequence the only role of the share value is determining s.
• In periods 1 to k > 1 each member i:
– saves si,t ∈ [0, s] with the group.
– then, borrows bi,t from the group. The amount borrowed cannot exceed three
times the amount saved with the group, and hence bi,t ∈ [0, 3 · si,t], where si,t ≡∑t
x=1 si,x.
– then, repays (1 + r)bi,t to the group, saves ai,t outside of the group, and consumes
the remaining resources. We assume that assets saved outside of the group earn
a return equal to zero.8
Given this sequence of events, a single period of our model is best interpreted as 3
months, which is the duration of each loan.
• In period k+ 1, the money collected by the group is redistributed to its members, who
each receive an amount proportional to the total amount saved with the group.
We call the per-period utility of consumption vi,t(ai,t, bi,t, si,t, r), where ai,t ≡ ai,0 +∑t
x=1 ai,x are total assets accumulated outside of the group and ai,0 are assets owned by the
8 All our results continue to hold if the return on funds stored outside of the group is negative (possibly
because of the risk of theft), at the cost of the introduction of an additional parameter (the return on ai,t).
If this return is positive then an additional constraint emerges: if the equilibrium return on savings that the
SG provides is too low, then the SG will not be in operation. Assuming a non-positive return on ai,t allows
us to abstract away from this possibility.
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agent at the start of the game.9 This is an indirect utility, that is, the maximum utility
level achievable during a period for given ai,t, bt, st, r. It implicitly depends on a number of
time- and individual-specific variables that are not related to savings groups: cash earned or
lost during a period, investment opportunities available and their returns, seasonal elements
(such as festivities) that may affect the marginal utility of consumption. Note also that
there could be some feasibility constraints due to, for example, the fact that consumption
must be non negative or that assets saved outside of the group must be non-negative. We
say that a triplet {ai,t, bi,t, si,t} is feasible if it belongs to the set Γi,t(r, ai,t−1), assumed non
empty, compact valued, and continuous (i.e., upper and lower hemicontinuous) in both its
arguments.
Some properties of vi,t(ai,t, bi,t, si,t, r) are straightforward. For tractability, we assume that
it is continuous in all its arguments, twice differentiable, with continuous first and second
derivatives. vi,t(ai,t, bi,t, si,t, r) is also decreasing in ai,t and si,t because more money saved
either with the group or outside the group implies lower consumption. It is also decreasing
in r if bi,t > 0 and constant in r if bi,t = 0. However, in order to show the existence of the
equilibrium of the game we also need to assume that vi,t(ai,t, bi,t, si,t, r) is strictly concave
in bi,t, ai,t and si,t.10 For example, if the return on the investment opportunities available
is strictly concave, then the return on bi,t is positive but decreasing with the scale of the
investment, possibly turning negative when the return on the investment falls below the cost
of borrowing r. In this case, vi,t(ai,t, bi,t, si,t, r) is strictly concave in bi,t. Similarly, if every
dollar not saved (either inside or outside the group) is consumed, then vi,t(ai,t, bi,t, si,t, r) is
strictly concave in ai,t and si,t simply because of decreasing marginal utility of consumption.11
9 Note that, at this point, we do not impose any restriction on the sign of ai,t and ai,0. Whether and to
what extent ai,t can be negative will be captured by the feasibility constraint, which we introduce below.
10 If these restrictions are violated, then optimal savings and borrowing may be a non-convex correspon-
dence, which prevents us from invoking standard fixed point theorems to show the existence of the equi-
librium. Of course, as an alternative to these restrictions we could introduce a less-standard definition of
equilibrium. Our results would be unchanged, but at the cost of more convoluted (and maybe opaque)
derivations.
11 To see this, note that if vi,t(ai,t, bi,t, si,t, r) is decreasing and strictly concave in ai,t and si,t, then
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Of course, if this dollar is instead first used for productive activities and then consumed, then
the shape of vi,t(ai,t, bi,t, si,t, r) depends on the return generated by these activities relative
to the change in the marginal utility of consumption. For our assumption to hold, it must
be that the utility function is sufficiently curved.
Individual maximization problem At the beginning of each period of operation of the
group, a member i decides how much to save and borrow with the group by maximizing
her utility, taking as given the assets accumulated outside of the group ai,t, and the savings
previously accumulated with the group si,t. This problem can be expressed in recursive
form:12
Vi,t (ai,t−1, si,t−1) = max
bi,t,si,t,ai,t
{vi,t(ai,t, bi,t, si,t, r) + βiVi,t+1 (ai,t, si,t)}
s.t.

{ai,t, bi,t, si,t} ∈ Γi,t(r, ai,t−1) feasibility constraint
bi,t ≤ C̃i,t aggregate resource constraint
bi,t ∈ [0, 3si,t] leverage constraint
si,t ∈ [0, s] maximum-savings constraint
with the utility at share out:
Vi,k+1 (ai,k, si,k) = (1 +R)si,k + ai,k.
where βi ∈ (0, 1) is agent i discount factor. Note that the money received at share out enters
linearly in the agent’s utility function, which therefore is quasilinear.
increasing ai,t and si,t decreases utility at an increasing rate. If increasing ai,t and si,t decreases consumption,
then this is equivalent to saying that decreasing consumption decreases utility at an increasing rate.
12 Note that we are implicitly assuming a deterministic environment. Uncertainty could easily be introduced
into the model by taking the expectation of Vi,t+1 (ai,t, Si,t). All our results would go through unchanged.
Note, however, that if there is uncertainty, the fact that there is a mismatch between supply and demand
for funds (which, as we will see, is one of our main results) may be due to the some unexpected large shock.
Considering a deterministic environment allows us to better highlight that this mismatch emerges due to the
rules of operation of SG.
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The term C̃i,t is the cash available to member i of the group at the beginning of each
period, defined as
C̃i,t = St +
t−1∑
x=1









i bi,t and St =
∑
i si,t are aggregate borrowing and savings in period t. In
other words, the cash available for borrowing to agent i in period t is given by the sum of
all excess savings (aggregate savings minus aggregate borrowings) plus the loans repayments
collected by the groups from period 1 to t, minus period-t loans given to all other members.






We conclude the description of the model by introducing our main assumption:
Assumption 1. The return on savings at the end of the cycle R and the funds available to
each member of the group in each period C̃i,t are taken as given by the group members but
are determined in equilibrium.
In the same way in which agents in a competitive market take prices as given, here the
group members take the return on savings and the availability of funds as given. This is
justified by the observation that the group is large, and hence the incentives to influence the
return on savings and the availability of funds by setting a specific si or bi are likely to be
negligible. As a consequence, we can treat R and C̃i,t as equilibrium quantities.
3 A model of Savings Groups 15
3.1 Individual saving and borrowing decision
Call si,t(r, R, C̃i,t) the optimal savings and bi,t(r, R, C̃i,t) the optimal borrowings of agent i
in period t, both continuous functions.13 The next lemma derives some useful comparative
statics.
Lemma 1 (Individual borrowings and savings). si,t(r, R, C̃i,t) and bi,t(r, R, C̃i,t) are:
• weakly increasing in R,
• weakly increasing in C̃i,t if the aggregate resource constraint is binding, and are inde-
pendent of C̃i,t otherwise.
The above results are quite intuitive, with the exception perhaps of the fact that bor-
rowing is increasing in the return on savings. This results is a consequence of the leverage
constraint, which implies that a member who wishes to borrow must first save. If an agent’s
leverage constraint is not binding, any change in R only affects the amount she saves with the
group. But if her leverage constraint is binding, then increases in R also relax the leverage
constraint, and thus increase borrowing. The leverage constraint is more likely to bind for
low level of savings, which implies that for low R both savings and borrowings increase with
R, but for R sufficiently large only savings should react to changes in R.
Finally, note that the scarcity of funds may not impact all group members equally: the
burden of rationing may falls disproportionately on some, and not others. We say that a
member is rationed out in period t if her demand for loans is strictly increasing in C̃i,t.
3.2 Rationing mechanism
Before solving for the equilibrium of the model, we need to discuss how C̃i,s is determined.
We assume that in each period, after the savings decisions are made, each member of the
13 Remember that, by the maximum theorem, if the objective function is strictly concave and continuous,
and the constraints are compact valued, non empty and continuous (i.e., upper and lower hemicontinuous),
then the solution to the maximization problem exists, is unique and is continuous.
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group announces her demand for loans, and the group determines each C̃i,t according to a
rationing mechanism that is:
• Resource monotonic: for given r, s and R, increasing the funds available to the group
weakly increases the amount borrowed by each member,
• Pareto efficient : the allocation of funds induced by the mechanism is never Pareto
dominated by another feasible allocation. In our context, this implies that if funds are
scarce, then no agent is allocated more resources than her actual demand for loans, so
that bi,t(r, R, C̃i,t) = C̃i,t. Of course, a different issue is whether an agent would borrow
more if she was allocated more resources. As already discussed, this is true only for
agents who are rationed out, and not for the others.
• Strategy-proof : no member has an incentive to misreport her demand for funds.
One mechanism often highlighted in the literature is the so-called uniform rule. This rule
amounts to imposing an upper bound on the level of borrowing achievable by each member.
If any member borrows less than the upper bound announced (because her peak is below
the upper bound), the remaining resources are distributed among the other members using
again the same mechanism. Kıbrıs (2003) considers an allocation problem with single peaked
preferences and free disposal (i.e. not all resources need to be allocated), and shows that the
uniform rule is the only strategy-proof mechanism that satisfies efficiency, no-envy, and is
resource monotonic.14 In our context, preferences are single peaked over bi,t (and the results
in Kıbrıs, 2003, apply) because vi,t(ai,t, bi,t, si,t, r) is strictly concave in bi,t.
Hence, the uniform rule is strategy-proof, efficient, satisfies no-envy, and is resource
monotonic for given amount of loadable funds. A different issue is whether the level of
14 A rationing rule satisfies no-envy if for every announcement profile, the allocation implemented by the
mechanism is such that no group member wants to swap what she received with what some other group
member received. It implies strategy-proofness. For a review of this literature and the formal definition of
these properties, see Thomson (2014).
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savings and, as a consequence, loanable funds is efficient. The remainder of the section is
devoted to exploring this issue.15
3.3 Aggregate savings and borrowings
The aggregate demand and supply of funds can be defined as St(R?) ≡
∑n
i=1 si,t(r, R, C̃i,t)
and Bt(R?) ≡ bi,t(r, R, C̃i,t), both continuous functions increasing in R (by Lemma 1).
Note that, whereas the individual demand and supply of funds depend both on R and
on C̃i,t, the expressions for the aggregate demand and supply of funds only depend on R (we
omit the dependency on r). The reason is that, in the individual maximization problem,
C̃i,t matters only if the aggregate resource constraint is binding. Furthermore, because the
rationing mechanism is Pareto optimal, the aggregate resource constraint is either binding
for everybody or not binding for anybody. Therefore, when studying aggregate savings
and aggregate borrowings within a given period, we can simply distinguish between R for
which the aggregate resource constraint is binding and R for which the aggregate resource
constraint is not binding.
For R for which the aggregate resource constraint is not binding, aggregate demand for
funds Bt(R) is independent of R, while St(R) is increasing in R. Instead, for R such that
the aggregate resource constraint is binding in a given period, we have bi,t = C̃i,t ∀i, and by
Equation 1:
Bt(R) = St(R) +
t−1∑
x=1




Hence, in periods in which funds are scarce, the funds collected by the group in a given period
(either as savings or as repayment on past loans) are perfectly correlated with aggregate
15 An interesting question is whether the group can do any better by auctioning off scarce funds, as in
bidding Roscas. Indeed, the uniform rule is efficient assuming that no side transfers are possible. But if we
move away from the SG model and introduce this possibility, then the uniform rule is not efficient anymore,
while competitive bids are. Once again, however, this is conditioned on a specific amount of loanable funds.
We show below that the level of these funds is, in general, inefficient. This result extends to the case in
which the group uses bids to allocate scarce funds.
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borrowings in that same period. This observation will play a central role in the next section,
where we empirically address the issue of funds scarcity. We therefore summarize it in the
following remark.
Remark 1. In periods in which funds are scarce, the correlation between loans disbursed and
funds collected by the group is 1. In periods in which funds are not scarce, loans disbursed
and amount of funds collected are uncorrelated.
3.4 Equilibrium










We now provide an important result of our framework: that an equilibrium R∗ always exists,
but multiple equilibria are possible.
Proposition 1 (Equilibrium). An equilibrium R? always exists. If multiple equilibria exist,
the one with the highest possible R? is the Pareto preferred equilibrium.
The above proposition shows that multiple equilibria are possible, and that these equilib-
ria can be Pareto ranked. This implies that there could be a coordination failures, because
self-fulfilling beliefs could lead the group to achieve a low R? while a high R? also exists.
This is, again, due to the fact that a borrower must first save, which implies that R plays a
role also in determining the cost of borrowing. When R is low, the cost of borrowing is high,
which may depress borrowing and reduce the return on savings. When R is high, instead,
the cost of borrowing is low, which may increase borrowings and the return on savings.
Note that the above proposition allows for equilibria in which R? = 0 and, effectively,
the group is not in operation. The following proposition provides sufficient conditions for
having R? > 0 in the Pareto preferred equilibrium.
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Proposition 2. Suppose r is such that ∂vi,t(ai,t,bi,t,si,t,r)
∂bi,t
|bi,t=0 > 0 for at least one i ∈ {1, .., n}
and t ≤ k (that is, borrowing at r is beneficial for at least some agents in some periods).
Suppose also that St(R) > 0 for all R > 0 and t < k (that is, there are always positive
savings for any positive R). Then there exists an equilibrium with R? > 0.
Hence, the group will be in operation if r is not too large and if members are willing
to contribute funds even for very small return on savings. The first of these conditions is
quite intuitive, and will never bind to the extent that r is chosen initially by the group. The
second one is also quite intuitive: as long as the return on group savings is larger than the
return on outside savings, some members will save in the group. Under these conditions,
at the Pareto preferred equilibrium the group is in operation and generates strictly positive
return on savings.
In the remainder of the paper, we will always assume that the group can coordinate on
the Pareto preferred equilibrium and that in this equilibrium R? > 0. Our goal is to show
that this equilibrium is, in general, not efficient.
3.5 Comparative statics
We start with a Corollary that follows directly from the proof of Proposition 2.
Corollary 1. At the Pareto preferred equilibrium R? > 0 the LHS of Equation (3) crosses
the RHS of equation (3) from below.
Knowing how aggregate borrowings and aggregate savings behave around the equilibrium
R? allows us to perform a number of comparative statics exercises.
Increase in aggregate savings Suppose that aggregate savings increases in all periods,
perhaps because a pure saver member is hit by a shock (for example, an unexpected windfall)
that increases her propensity to save at every r, R and C̃i,t. If the resource constraint is
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never binding, the increase in aggregate savings has no effect on aggregate borrowing for
given R. Hence, the behavioral responses of the other group members is driven by the fact
that, by proposition 1, when
∑
t St(R) shifts upward R
? decreases.
Corollary 2. Suppose that the aggregate resource constraint is never binding. Furthermore,
suppose that there is a change in the behavior of one of the group members, leading to an
upward shift in St(R) (for some t). As a consequence, R? decreases and everybody else in
the group is worse off.
Proof. In the text.
If, instead, the aggregate resource constraints is always binding, adding resources to the
group has also a direct effect on the borrowing levels that are possible within the group.
Corollary 3. Suppose that the aggregate resource constraint is always binding. Furthermore,
suppose that there is a change in the behavior of one of the group members, leading to an
upward shift in St(R) by the same factor in every period t. Every member’s borrowing
(weakly) increases and is (weakly) better off.
The above corollary considers only shifts in aggregate savings by the same factor in
every period. We discuss later the fact that the time-profile of savings has an impact on
the availability of funds for the group members. In particular, we will argue that shifting
savings from later periods to earlier periods is always welfare improving to the group; while
the opposite is welfare decreasing (see Corollary 6). Hence, the above corollary is true also
when early savings increases more than later savings (in percentage terms), but may not
hold if later savings increase less than early savings.
The two corollaries illustrate an important result of the model: exogenous increases in
the funds available for lending will impose an externality on other participants. The key
determinant of the sign of this externality is whether the group is resource constrained.
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Quite intuitively, when the resources within the group are scarce (resp. abundant), adding
more resources is beneficial (resp. hurtful) to the others.
When the resource constraint is binding only in some periods, the overall welfare effect
of adding resources is ambiguous. All members are made worse off by the addition of extra
funds because they decrease R?. However, net borrowers who are rationed out benefit from
the availability of extra funds.
Increase in aggregate borrowing We can similarly analyze what happen when a group
member increases her demand for loans due to an exogenous shock. The shock shifts Bt(R)
up in every period, leaving unchanged the aggregate supply of funds St(R). Proposition 1
leads to the following corollary.
Corollary 4. If the aggregate resource constraint is never binding, then an increase in∑
tBt(R) leads to an increase in R
?, higher individual savings and borrowing. Everybody in
the group is better off.
Proof. In the text.
When the aggregate resource constraint is always binding, the impact of an increase in
aggregate borrowings depends on how the funds are rationed among borrowers. For example,
if the new demand for funds goes completely unmet, then existing members are indifferent
to the increase in the demand for funds. If it decreases the amount of funds available to
other borrowers, the latter are made worse off by the increase in the demand for funds.
Corollary 5. If the resource constraint is always binding, an increase in the demand for
loans has no effect on R?, but may make rationing worse for some group members. As a
consequence, everybody in the group is weakly worse off.
Proof. In the text.
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Similarly, if the resource constraint is binding in some periods but not others, the welfare
effect of increasing the demand for funds is ambiguous. While everyone benefits from an
increase in R?, net borrowers may be hurt by the increase in rationing.
Supply of funds over time There is an additional dimension that is relevant in determining
the efficiency of the group: the timing of saving. Suppose that cumulative aggregate savings
are constant, but that for exogenous reasons the timing of savings changes. In particular,
assume that the reallocation leads to saving earlier. It is quite immediate to see that if the
aggregate resource constraint is never binding, this reallocation of savings has no impact on
the return on savings and no impact on the group members’ welfare.
Next, suppose that the aggregate resource constraint is binding in period t < k − 1 such
that some loans are rationed. The reallocation of savings from period t + 1 to period t
increases the loans given out in period t. In addition, all these loans will be repaid at the
end of period t. So, for every dollar that is reallocated from period t + 1 to period t, 1 + r
dollars become available in period t+1. This reallocation eases any rationing that is present
in period t+ 1 as well.
Corollary 6. Suppose the resource constraint is binding in period t<k-1. Suppose that St(R)
increases and St+1(R) decreases by the same amount. It follows that R? increases, and all
agents increase their level of borrowing and savings. All agents are better off. If instead the
resource constraint in period t is not binding, reallocating funds from one period to the other
has no impact on R? and no impact on the group members’ welfare.
Proof. In the text.
3.6 Period 0: setting the rules
So far, we have treated the price of a loan r and the maximum savings s̄ as given. These values
are chosen by the group at the beginning of the cycle, and are an important determinant of
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whether there will be a mismatch between demand and supply of funds.
To start, note that it is not possible to use standard social choice results to make a clear
prediction regarding the rules chosen by the group. The reason is that preferences over r
and s are not single peaked. For r sufficiently large an agent may anticipate that she will
never borrow, and hence her preferred r is the one that maximizes the return on savings.
But for sufficiently low r she may expect to borrow from the group, in which case she may
prefer a lower r than the one that maximizes R∗. Hence an agent’s preference have (at least)
two peaks over r.16
When preferences are not single peaked, the collective decision over r and s depends on
the details of the voting game being played, such as who can propose options for voting,
how many voting rounds are allowed, how long can voting last, whether options that have
previously been outvoted can be re-proposed, and so on. Because the voting procedure is not
part of the rules of functioning of a SG, each group is likely to adopt a different procedure. In
order to fully solve the model without specifying the voting game, we introduce the following
assumption.
Assumption 2 (“Veil of ignorance”). All agents are under a “veil of ignorance” in period 0.
That is, they are identical in period 0 but heterogeneous from period 1 onward. Furthermore,
in period 0 they know the set of “types” that will be revealed in period 1.
We now move to studying the individual preferences over r. The next proposition consid-
ers a member who is primarily concerned with her ability to borrow, and shows that, despite
this, her preferred r and s will prevent herself from fully meeting her own demand for loans
once the group is in operation.
16 There could be more than two peaks because there is a trade off between availability of funds (which
is increasing in r), and cost of borrowing (decreasing in r). As a consequence, the overall effect of changes
in r on the agent’s utility need not be monotonic, even if we focus exclusively on r such that the agent is a
borrower.
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Proposition 3. Consider a given agent i and assume that βki is sufficiently small (that is,
the utility at share out is small from period-0 viewpoint, either because k is large or because
βi is small). If given the option to choose a r and s, agent i’s choice is such that she will be
rationed out of funds.
The intuition for this result is based on a straightforward application of the envelope
theorem. Suppose r is such that an agent can fully meet her demand for loans, but any
smaller r will cause this agent to be rationed out of funds. If r decreases, then two things
happen: the agent will decrease the amount borrowed, but at the same time borrowing
becomes less expensive. By the envelope theorem, if the agent was already borrowing at
the optimal level, any small reduction in the amount borrowed has only second-order effects.
The first order effect is given by a reduction in the cost of borrowing. Hence the agent prefers
an r such that she is rationed out of funds to a larger r.
Importantly, however, this does not mean that the effect of scarcity is, on aggregate,
second order. To see this, note that if an agent is already rationed out of funds, then the
envelope theorem will not apply: a further reduction in the ability to borrow will have first
order effects on this agent’s utility. This effect is totally disregarded if the choice of r is
made by a different group member.
The above proposition together with Assumption 2 immediately imply the following
corollary.
Corollary 7. Assume βki small for all i. If the choice of r and s is made under a “veil of
ignorance” then there will be scarcity of funds.
Note that if nobody is expected to be rationed out of funds, then again the envelope
theorem applies: from period 0 view point reducing r has only second order effects. Hence
it must be that at the r and s chosen by the “representative agent” in period 0 someone will
be rationed out of funds. In what follows, we maintain both the assumption that βki small
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and the “veil of ignorance” assumption.17
3.7 Discussion: the role of group composition
The model abstracts away from an important element of group’s performance: the endoge-
nous process of group’s composition. Fully modeling this process is beyond the scope of this
paper. We can, however, discuss whether we should expect our main result (i.e., the possi-
bility of mismatch between supply and demand of funds) to hold even if group’s members
are allowed to self select into groups.
Standard matching theory predicts that matching patterns are efficient if utility is trans-
ferable, while they may not be efficient if utility is not transferable (see Legros and Newman,
2007). Utility is transferable if agents can use side payments to convince other agents to
match with them.
This principle applies to our context as well. As already discussed, substituting a mem-
ber of the group with a person having a different propensity to save or borrow generates an
externality on the other members of the group, which could be positive or negative. Quite
clearly, if side payments are allowed, then these payments can be used to internalize these
externalities. For example, a group can use side payment to convince a particularly “ben-
eficial” member to join. Similarly, a member who will generate a negative externality on
the group can compensate the other members via side payments. The resulting matching
pattern will be the one that maximize surplus, that is, the one that better matches supply
and demand of funds.
Instead, if no side payments are possible, the decision to join a group will depend ex-
clusively on the individual utility of joining and not on the externality generated. There
is no presumption that the resulting matching pattern will be efficient. Note that this is
17 Alternatively, we could have assumed that a given member is a dictator (that is, a prominent member
of the group can impose her preferred rules) or that for some reason, a Condorcet winner exists (so that the
r chosen by the group is the median favorite r). By Proposition 3, the result would be the same: the choice
of r leads to scarcity. Assumption 2 seems, to us, a more reasonable way to close the model.
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consistent with the empirical evidence in Cassidy and Fafchamps (2018). They show that
present-biased individuals form SGs with individuals who are not present biased, indicating
that SGs are able to act as financial intermediaries between savers and borrowers. The role
of SGs as financial intermediary is, however, limited by the fact that individuals belong-
ing to the same occupation tend to join the same groups, therefore exposing the groups to
correlated shocks which could instead be smoothed out if people matched across occupations.
4 Empirical analysis
We complement the theoretical model with an empirical analysis of the weekly cashbook
entries of 46 Ugandan savings groups, operating for a total of 66 cycles. Our goal is to show
empirically that the mismatch between supply and demand for funds is a defining feature of
SGs, so to validate the main premise of the model.
4.1 Data: group cashbooks
Group cashbooks record, for each meeting, the meeting date; total amounts deposited be-
cause of loan repayments, savings, and fines; total amount disbursed as loans; and a running
balance of the cash remaining in the box (See Figure 1 for a picture of the raw data). Ap-
pendix B provides a detailed discussion of the processing of this hand-written data source.
22 groups in our sample are a subsample of the groups studied in Burlando and Canidio
(2017) (BC). The remaining 24 groups are a subsample of groups studied in Burlando,
Goldberg, and Etcheverry (2018) (BGE). BC groups were created in 2013, and the cashbook
data are relative to their first cycle. They were formed under a policy that actively recruited
very vulnerable participants. We refer to these groups as “newly formed.” BGE groups
instead were formed following “standard” VSLA procedures by a local NGO in the Central
Region of Uganda, and were already operating at the time of the study. Thus, they are less
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Fig. 1: An example of a hand-written ledger entry from a savings group cashbook. First
column includes positive cash in from savings, fines and repayments; second column
includes cash out; last column is the running balance after each transaction. The last
entry for each week is the end of meeting balance.
poor than BC groups and more representative of SGs found in Uganda. We refer to them as
“experienced groups.” For 17 “experienced groups” we have information on more than one
cycle available; in total, our sample consists of 66 completed cycles.
It is important to remark that neither newly formed groups nor experienced groups are
a random draw from the groups in BC and BGE, respectively. Our goal was to collect
week-by-week data for all groups in BC and BGE. However, pictures of cashbooks were not
available for all groups, and not all pictures were sufficiently clear or complete. In Appendix
C we show that newly formed groups produced more savings and more loans than the overall
sample in BC. While a similar analysis is not available for the BGE groups, it is reasonable
to expect that experienced groups are also positively selected from the sample in BGE.
Summary statistics Table 1 provides summary statistics from the cashbook records, both
for the pooled sample and for the two subsamples of newly formed and experienced groups.
Savings, loan repayments, and fines (levied against members who are tardy or otherwise
break some internal rule) represent the sources of revenue or cash in. Loan are the sole
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Tab. 1: End of cycle summary statistics of cashbook records.
source of cash out. Experienced groups generate larger volumes relative to the newly formed
groups, consistent with the fact that they serve a wealthier population: total savings was
over 9 million UGX (or $3,000 at the 3,000 UGX per dollar exchange rate prevalent in 2015)
compared to 3.5 million UGX ($1,350 at a 2,600 UGX per dollar exchange prevalent in 2013)
in newly formed groups; total loans was 13.02 million and 5 million UGX respectively. In both
samples, each shilling saved was lent out multiple times (1.46 times in newly formed groups,
1.37 times in experienced groups). While repayments should be larger than total loans due
to the interest rate accrual, this is not always the case. According to our observations, and
consistent with Le Polain, Sterck, and Nyssens (2018), this may be explained by the fact
that loans given out toward the end of the cycle are sometimes repaid at share out, so to
avoid an excessive accumulation of funds in the group’s cash box during a period in which
no new loans can be given out.
While groups in the two subsamples appear to operate at very different scales, they
share very similar patterns of behavior. In the next section we pool the data from the two
subsamples, and refer the reader to the web appendix where we report results separately for
the two samples.
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Fig. 2: Data from the 66 completed cycles in the sample. Length of the cycle normalized to twenty quantiles
(x axis). Left axis is the scale for flow variables (savings and loans per meeting); right axis is scale
for stock variables (carryover balance), which we refer as “cash in the box”.
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Savings and lending over the cycle Figure 6 plots the evolution of cash balances, per-
period savings, and per-period loans disbursed over the duration of the cycle. Since groups
operate for a different number of weeks, the length of the cycle has been normalized into
twenty quantiles. Thus, the first quantile corresponds to the first 5% of meetings, the second
quantile corresponds to the second 5%, and so on. It is notable that saving contributions
remain quite stable over the duration of the cycle, whereas loans grow over time and peak
in mid-cycle. Balances grow exponentially, but remain low until the latter part of the cycle.
End of cycle balances reach 6.5 million UGX (2.5 million and 8 million for newly formed and
experienced groups respectively).
Figure 6 illustrates that many groups keep low balances. 25 percent of groups had less
than 15,000 UGX ($5.60) available at the end of the meeting during the first half of the
cycle. This proportion drops steadily to 10 percent or less in the last quarter the cycle.
Cash balances increase steadily over the length of the cycle, eventually increasing above the
average value of loans given out. This is suggestive that groups may be operating under
scarcity during the first part of the cycle, while funds are left unused in the latter part.
4.2 Identification of scarcity
The empirical test for scarcity is based on Equation (2) and Remark 1. The intuition is
that, absent scarcity, the demand for loans depends on the supply of funds only through the
equilibrium cost of borrowing. Hence, groups are not resource constrained if the amount
of loans disbursed does not depend on the cash put into the box that day. Groups are,
instead, resource constrained whenever the relationship between cash brought in (savings,
repayments, and fines) and the amount lent out is close to one-to-one (see equation 2). That
is, controlling for the cost of borrowing, every dollar put in the box at the beginning of the
meeting is lent out in the same meeting.
We operationalize this intuition by regressing loans made at a particular meeting t in
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Fig. 3: Fraction of groups reporting balances close to zero, by meeting quantile.
cycle c for group g on the cash added to the box controlling for the cost of borrowing
(captured by a group-cycle fixed effect). To allow for the relationship to change across time,
we interact this cash-in measure with a series of dummy variables for the quantile of the
meeting. Equation (4) is our base specification:
Lgct = β0 + β1CashIngct +
Q∑
q=2





t + δgc + ugct, (4)
where Lgt are loans disbursed in group g during meeting t, CashIngct are savings, fines,
and loan repayments collected during that meeting, Dqt is a dummy variable that takes on
a value of one if the meeting falls in quantile q and zero otherwise, δgc captures group cycle
fixed effects (which controls for groups’ characteristics and group’s rules, including the cost
of borrowing), and ugct is an error term.
By including dummy variables in this way, we can interpret β1 to be the fraction of cash
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brought in that was distributed out in loans during the first five percent of meetings, and
β1 + βq for (q = 2, ..., Q) is the fraction of cash inflows that is lent out in each subsequent
quantile. Periods where lending is not constrained should be characterized by saving and
borrowing being uncorrelated: β1 +βq = 0. Periods where β1 +βq = 1 correspond to periods
where all cash inflows are lent out, which suggests that loans are being rationed and limited
by the availability of funds. Note that, if there are residual resources from previous meetings
that are lent out, it can be that β1 + βq > 1.
The method above also suggests a strategy to determine whether a specific group g is
resource constrained in cycle c: if, on average, the correlation between cash inflows and out-
flows is close to one during the lending period, then we can say that the group is constrained
in that cycle. This can be captured by regressing inflows and outflows one group-cycle at a
time:




t × LoanPeriodt + u
gc
t , (5)
where LoanPeriod is an indicator for meetings occurring between the 20th and and the 80th
percentile of the cycle, when most lending occurs.18 α1+α2 captures the effect of introducing
cash during the lending period. The test for scarcity in group g and cycle c is a simple t-test
for α1 + α2 = 1, where scarcity is rejected if the test is rejected.
4.3 Results
Evidence of scarcity Figure 8 reports the parameter estimates (β1 + βq) from regression
(4) across the twenty meeting quantiles. Consistent with credit rationing, lending moves at a
one-to-one rate with cash coming in the first part of the cycle. The correlation between cash
in and cash out begins to decline around the 60th meeting percentile. Lending is shut down
18 Many groups lend immediately after a new cycle begins, while others follow a rule that bans lending in
the first few meetings.
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Fig. 4: Estimates of β1 + βq.
at the end of the cycle to allow repayments, and loans and cash in become uncorrelated19.
The pattern is similar for groups with large and small savings amounts, suggesting that
rationing is a defining feature of SGs.
We next report regression estimates of equation (4) in Table 2. Column 1 report the
OLS estimate for the average fraction of cash brought in that is distributed as loans across
the cycle (controlling for group-cycle fixed effects). Because at the end of the cycle groups
end lending altogether, this estimate is averaging over a series of zeros and we can anticipate
that it may be biased downward. Next, we interact the flow of cash in during a meeting with
a dummy variable for the percentage of meetings that has passed (column 2), which and are
the basis for Figure 8. The parameter estimate for “Meeting Cash In” is the fraction of cash
during the first five percent of meetings that was lent out. Columns 3 include month fixed
19 Notably, three groups appear to lend out most of the balance around the 95th meeting percentile. These
account for the “spike” observed in the figure. Since these loans do not appear in the repayment, we speculate
that security concerns led these groups to distribute their cash among their members
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effects to accommodate seasonality in lending. The results from estimating Equation (4) do
not change drastically with this adjustment.
In Table 3, we further address the remaining concern that an omitted variable influences
contemporaneous cash in and cash out. Specifically, groups with a larger stock of outstanding
loans may have a higher cash-in and a lower demand for loans. We replicate table 2 using the
subsample of newly formed groups in columns 1-3. In column 4, we add interaction terms
for outstanding loan balances with meeting quantiles to control for this correlation, with no
effect on our conclusions. The analysis is done on newly formed groups, as the calculation
of the outstanding balance requires the use of an unobservable variable in the experienced
groups (the interest rate on loans).
As a final exercise, we regress (5) one group-cycle at the time, and define a group to
suffer from rationing if α1 +α2 = 1; i.e., if the average correlation between cash deposits and
cash withdrawals is 1 between the 20th and 80th percentile of meetings. Panel A of Table 4
tabulates the number of cycles that are rationed versus not rationed. 60% of the groups are
indeed rationed by our measure. The rest of the table explores heterogeneity across groups.
While the proportion of rationed group is higher among newly formed groups (68%), it is
notable that rationing is also highly prevalent in experienced groups. This points to rationing
as a defining feature of groups of all types. Panel B focuses on the 17 experienced groups
for which we have complete information on two or three cycles. We compare the earliest
cycles in our possession to the later cycles, and find some indication that the rationing eases
somewhat over time: rationed cycles make up over 70% of the early sample, but only half of
the late sample.
Excess funds A second inefficiency identified in our model the accumulation of resources
that are not productively deployed. This can be seen in Figure 6, as well as in Figure 9
which plots three different quantiles (top 25%, median, bottom 25%) of the weekly carryover
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(1) (2) (3)
Dep. Var: Loan Amount








































Observations 3,033 3,033 3,033
R-squared 0.198 0.359 0.367
Cycle f.e. yes yes yes
Meeting Quantile f.e. no yes yes
month f.e. no no yes
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Tab. 2: Regression estimates of βq on loans distributed.
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Tab. 3: Balances vs. loan requests, newly formed groups only
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Tab. 4: Count of groups for which the estimate α1 + α2 = 1 in regression (5).
Rationed cycle: cycle for which we fail to reject α1 + α2 = 1 using a two-sided T-test and
a confidence internal of 90%. Non-rationed cycle: cycle for which we reject α1 + α2 = 1.
Fig. 5: Balances vs. loan requests
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balance. These figures show that there is accumulation of unused funds starting from roughly
the middle of the cycle until the end of the cycle.
There are, of course, a number of reasons why allowing funds to remain idle may be
efficient. First, there might be constraints on the minimum loan sizes that can be given out
by the groups. This is unlikely to be the most important factor: figure 9 plots median and
top quartile of loans disbursed against balances, and clearly the majority of groups have
higher balances than loan disbursements for about half of their cycle. A second possibility is
that the accumulation of unused funds is a form of precautionary savings: cash is left in the
box because, with some probability, better investment opportunities may arise in the future.
Although this mechanism certainly plays a role, we should expect it to become less relevant
as the group approaches its share-out date, which is not what happen in the data.
5 Policy implications
Using the theoretical insights gained from the model, we can now turn to the question of
what can be done to improve the workings of savings groups. We show earlier that group’s
performance will depend strongly on the group’s ability to coordinate on the Pareto preferred
equilibrium. This may be related to the quality of training provided to the group, the level
of competence of the field officer helping the group in their operations, or the quality of the
leaders elected by the groups (as in Deserranno et al., 2019). This suggests that improving
all these operational aspects should be a primary policy objective.
With respect to the possible mismatch between supply and demand for funds, here we
discuss two possible changes to the functioning of SGs: allowing the groups members to
anticipate their savings, and linking SGs with formal financial institutions.
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5.1 Anticipation of savings
One of the main theoretical results of the paper is that a member who, for some exogenous
reasons, anticipates her savings generates a positive externality on the other members. Here
we discuss changes to the rules that can induce such member to save early.
Suppose we knew that, under standard SG functioning, member i will save s̄ in period t.
Under a policy of anticipation of savings, such member is allowed to save s̄+ s̃ in any period
before t, provided that she saves s̄ − s̃ in period t.20 If members i chooses to anticipate
savings, then by revealed preferences she is better off than under standard SG rules. By
Corollary 6, all other members of the group must also be weakly better off. This also implies
that those who save early could be rewarded by the group. For example, savings shifted to
earlier periods could generate higher return than “normal” savings.
Note, however, that if member i was planning to save less than s̄ in period t, such policy
may lead to an increase of total savings. This is because member i can “accept” to anticipate
savings, while simply saving more in a period before t without decreasing what she was
planning to save anyway in period t. In that case, cumulative savings would increase and by
Corollary 6, the result may not be Pareto improving. A practical solution to this problem is
to only allow to shift savings from the last few meetings of the cycle, because close to share
out there is a strong incentive to save the maximum level. Thus, shifting savings from those
meetings is unlikely to generate an increase in aggregate savings. Such policy will reduce
scarcity at every r and s chosen by the group, and therefore make everybody better off for
given r and s.
Finally, the policy may also have an effect also on the rules chosen by the group. Remem-
ber that lowering r allows to borrow more cheaply but may exacerbate scarcity and reduce
each member’s ability to borrow. Because anticipating savings decreases scarcity, if member
20 In practice, groups could “stamp” the anticipated savings in the section of the savings booklet devoted
for savings in period t, even if these savings occur during an earlier period. This would allow the group to
easily keep track of anticipated savings.
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i had a preferred interest rate r∗i before the policy, she will have a preferred interest rate
r∗′i ≤ r∗i after the policy. The interest rate chosen by the group will therefore be (weakly)
lower then absent the policy. Under our assumptions, the policy will make everybody better
off also from period-0 viewpoint.
5.2 Financial linkages
A second intervention we consider is the possibility of borrowing from formal financial insti-
tutions such as commercial banks. Such services, broadly known as linkages in the financial
industry, are already marketed in a number of countries. According to the State of Linkage
Report 2016, there were close to one hundred financial service providers offering financial
services to SG in 27 countries; 40% of these financial service providers offer loans to groups
(Barclays et al., 2016). In sub-Saharan Africa, the report lists 25 institutions offering credit
to savings groups in nine separate countries, with six institutions in Uganda alone; terms of
loans vary by institution.
In our model, linking SG with existing financial institutions can, indeed, lead to a Pareto
improvement. For given s̄ and r the argument is straightforward. Consider a set of rules s̄
and r such that there is scarcity of funds at some point during the cycle. Suppose an external
financial institutions contributes x to the group on condition of receiving (1 + µ)x at share
out. If x is sufficiently small (so that the group does not become cash abundant) and µ < r,
then everybody in the group is strictly better off: the extra funds will be lent out at least
once, allowing some of the group member to meet (at least partially) their demand for loan,
generating a return of at least r, and generating at least (r − µ)x to be shared among the
group members at share out. Of course, this mechanism is feasible for some µ > 0 only if r
is above the cost of funding faced by the financial institution.
Consider now period 0, in which s̄ and r are chosen. Assume, first, that the terms of the
agreement with the financial institution (i.e., x and µ) have already been set, so that the
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financial institution can either participate with x and µ or walk away. The basic trade off in
the choice of r is, again, that lowering r allows to borrow more cheaply but may exacerbate
scarcity. The introduction of the financial institution affects this tradeoff because, now, for
given r ≥ µ there is an additional x to borrow in each period, which, by the uniform rule,
will benefit everybody in the group. The interest rate chosen by the group will therefore be
(weakly) lower when the group is linked than when the group is not linked.
Suppose now that the group chooses s̄ and r, and only afterward the financial institution
will offer x and µ. Call the cost of borrowing for the financial institution r̃, such that it will
be willing to supply any x at a µ ≥ r̃. Anticipating this, the group can completely eliminate
scarcity by setting r such that the return on x is exactly r̃21. This way, the group adopts
internally the prevailing, external interest rate r̃ and completely eliminates scarcity.
In both cases, creating a linkage with a financial institution should lead to a decrease in
the interest rate charged by the group and a decrease (or elimination) of scarcity. Under the
assumption made in Section 3.6, it is Pareto improving because all members can now borrow
more and more cheaply.
6 Conclusion
Savings groups are quickly becoming an important component of financial portfolios of mil-
lions of people in low income countries, especially in sub-Saharan Africa. Given this, it is
crucial to study their inefficiencies and propose remedies. In this paper, we discuss two
policies that, based on our theoretical model and our empirical results, could improve the
functioning of SGs. These policies require empirical verification, and it is our hope that our
paper can provide the motivation for future evaluations in the field.
The model we propose can be extended in important directions. For example, we assume
21 If x is lent out only once, this is would r ≥ r̃. If instead x is lent out multiple times, this can be achieved
also by some r < r̃.
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away moral hazard, behavioral biases, asymmetric information, and all other potential source
of inefficiencies. We did so to better show that the rules of functioning of SGs may lead to
inefficient outcomes. It is however well known that introducing a second source of inefficiency
to a world that is already second best may generate a welfare gain. For example, it may as
well be that, if agents are present biased and hence prone to overindebteness, the fact that
funds are rationed may actually be quite beneficial. Exploring the interaction between SG
rules and other potential sources of inefficiencies is left for future work.
A Mathematical derivations
Proof of Lemma 1. Note that si,t and R are complements in the objective function. There-
fore by Topkis’s theorem si,t(r, R, C̃i,t) is weakly increasing inR. But an increase in si,t(r, R, C̃i,t)
relaxes the leverage constraint, allowing for higher level of borrowings. So also bi,t(r, R, C̃i,t)
is weakly increasing in R.
Finally, bi,t(r, R, C̃i,t) is weakly increasing in C̃i,t because increasing C̃i,t relaxes the ag-
gregate resource constraint and allows for higher borrowing. At the same time, increasing
C̃i,t may make the leverage constraint binding (instead of the aggregate resource constraint).
When this is the case, the incentive to save increases because increasing savings relaxes the
leverage constraint. To say it differently: as C̃i,t increases, the amount that can be borrowed
increases, and with it the amount that needs to be saved in order to reach a given level of
borrowing.
Proof of Proposition 1. We start by discussing existence. To start, note that that each St(R)
is bounded above by
∑
i mini{wi, s}. It follows that each Bt(R) is also bounded above.
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which, by continuity, implies that an R? must exist.
For multiplicity, note that aggregate demand for savings and aggregate demand for loans
inherit the properties of the individual demand for savings and loans derived in Lemma 1.
Hence, both aggregate loans and aggregate savings are increasing in R, which implies that
R
∑
t St(R) and r
∑
tBt(R) are both increasing and may cross multiple times. Finally, all
members of the groups prefer equilibria with high R∗, because both savers and borrowers
receive a higher return on their savings, and more funds are disbursed by the groups.
Proof of Proposition 2. There are two cases to consider. The first one is when savings are
strictly positive at R = 0 (possibly because some agents want to borrow in the future). At








and hence it must be that R? > 0.









which is equal to zero at R = 0 if savings are zero at R = 0. On the other hand, note that






> 0. The reason is that, under our assumption, the group is constrained at R = 0
in at least one period. In this period, as savings increase with R so do borrowings. This
















By continuity, then, an R? > 0 must exist. Not only, but at the largest R? > 0 it must be
that R
∑
t St(R) crosses r
∑
tBt(R) from below.
Proof of Proposition 3. If βki is arbitrarily small, the only determinant of the choice over
r and s is the ability to borrow. Hence, everybody agrees that s should maximize the
availability of funds.22
With respect to r, suppose that, at a given r, agent i is able to fully meet her demand









Under our assumptions, the last term of the above expression can be ignored. The first term
of the above expression is negative. Hence the agent benefits from decreasing r below the
level at which she can fully meet her own demand for loans.
22 Note the amount of cash available for borrowing may not be monotonic in s. For example, if the person
saving the most is actually a net borrower, constraining this person in the amount she can save may generate
more resources to the remaining members of the group.
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B Data Cleaning Procedure
The paper made use of meeting-level data from handwritten registries of a number of Ugandan
savings groups from two studies: Burlando et al. (2018) and Burlando and Canidio (2017). The
data cleaning process was similar for both sets. Of the 110 groups that were part of the Burlando
and Canidio (2017), 70 groups submitted photographs of their cashbooks for their first cycle in
2015. For 29 groups their cashbooks had missing or illegible parts. Of the remaining 41 groups,
22 were thoroughly cleaned and reconciled, with the rest being disqualified because problems with
reconciliation, missing data, missing cycles, or unusual and non-standard accounting methods. Of
the 154 groups that were part of the Burlando et al. (2018) study, 83 groups submitted photographs
of their cashbooks for one or more cycle in 2016. Many of these pictures had missing pages, poor
focus, or were otherwise difficult (if not impossible) to digitize. We then digitized 50 groups that
looked complete. Of these groups, 24 were thoroughly cleaned and reconciled, with the rest being
disqualified because problems with reconciliation, missing data, non-standard accounting methods,
or missing cycles.
In order to determine whether there was an error in any particular record, we reconstructed the
cash-in-the-box balance from meeting to meeting (cash-in minus cash-out plus balance from previous
period). We then looked at the difference between the reported balance with our calculated balance
and found that 59.2% of the observations required an edit. The primary reason for these edits were
omissions and typos due to the digitization of the picture data which was easily corrected for by
looking at the photos and inputting the correct amounts. Occasionally, there was a miscalculation or
written error by the record keeper for the group which could be correctly interpolated from correct
data. Even through our careful cleaning, 44.1% of observations retained some level of discrepancy
in reported balances relative to our calculated balances. These discrepancies were generally quite
small.
It should be noted that our high rejection rate of groups and cycles was largely driven by our need
to reduce discrepancies between hand-written end of meeting balances and computed balances; i.e.,
like traditional auditors, we needed to “balance the books”. Without such balancing, we are unable
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to generate Figures 6 and 7. Such balancing is almost impossible with simple mistakes affecting
only a few entries, such as creases in the photos that obscure parts of the record; missing pages; or
unclear handwriting. On the other hand, balancing the books is not necessary when implementing
the test for scarcity implied in regressions (4) and (5). Unbiased test results can be obtained from a
subset of the data, and any mistakes in reported cash inflows and outflows will create a downward
bias.
C Comparison of “new groups” sample with Burlando and Canidio
(2017) sample
In this section we compare all groups studied in Burlando and Canidio (2017) with the
subsample from Burlando and Canidio (2017) for which we have week-by-week data (the
“new groups”). Specifically, we use the entire sample to run regression (2) in Burlando and
Canidio (2017), with the main independent variable being an indicator for whether we have
cashbook records. We report the results in the same format as table 7 of Burlando and
Canidio (2017) . These results are presented in table A1. It is clear that the groups in our
sample differ from the groups in the study: they generate on average more loans, both early
in the cycle and later in the sample. They also generate more savings early and late in the
sample, although panel B seems to indicate that they generate fewer savings in the middle
of the cycle.
In results not shown, we also find that members of the sampled groups have lower vul-
nerability profiles than members of the remaining groups, again indicating that sampled
groups are different. Finally, while sampled groups include both treated and control SGs
(as described in the Burlando and Canidio, 2017), the two treatment arms are not balanced
along baseline characteristics.
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Dep var: row title (1) (2) (3)
Coefficient on indicator for groups 
with cashbook records
Panel A: Wave I
Cumulative savings 278,664 228,810 233,138**
(223,000) (153,533) (91,770)
Cumulative loans 1,109,400*** 402,087 467,593**
(315,761) (314,514) (232,894)
Number of groups 115 115 115
Panel B: Wave II
Cumulative savings 98,315 -434,835* -411,560*
(190,389) (237,704) (241,299)
Cumulative loans 1,795,799** 735,327 656,337
(720,841) (755,227) (743,991)
Number of groups 102 102 102
Panel C: End of cycle
Cumulative savings 710,369** 397,574 448,372*
(305,774) (294,620) (228,926)
Cumulative loans 821,507 664,930 698,104
(711,299) (758,753) (732,232)
Return on savings -1.475 -0.362 0.076
(1.583) (1.657) (1.725)
Number of groups 110 110 110
Table reports coefficients on the indicator for groups that had cashbook records,
from group level regressions including all VSLAs in Burlando and Canidio (2017).
Refer to Burlando and Canidio (2017) for a description of the data and analysis. Each
cell is a separate regression. Cumulative savings and cumulative loans in UGX,
aggregated from individual savings and loans. Return on savings (panel C)
calculated at shareout. Rules fixed effects include dummies for the interest rate and
the share price. Number of groups differ in each wave because not all groups were
audited in each wave. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses. ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Tab. A1: Comparison of group outcomes between new groups in the cashbook sample and
groups not in the cashbook sample
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D Web Appendix
We reproduce in this appendix the main figures of the paper. The data is split between
newly formed groups that were part of the Burlando and Canidio (2017) study (BC) and
the experienced groups that were part of the Burlando et al. (2018) study (BGE).
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Fig. 6: This figure corresponds to figure 2 in the main text. Left axis is the scale for flow variables (savings
and loans per meeting); right axis is scale for stock variables (carryover balance), which we refer as
"cash in the box".
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Fig. 7: This figure corresponds to figure 3 in the main text. Fraction of groups with low
balances by meeting period
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Fig. 8: This figure corresponds to figure 4 in the main text. Estimates of βq.
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Fig. 9: This figure corresponds to figure 5 in the main text. Balances vs. loan requests
